A Time to Forgive People Who Reject Classical Theism

By Jordan Ferrier

A layperson’s response to Chris Stockman’s assertion that the God of Classical Theism cannot forgive sinners because forgiveness requires an immutable, atemporal, God to change.

Classical Theism (CT) is a vast topic. In 2023, Fuqua and Koons released a book, Classical Theism: New Essays on the Metaphysics of God. Taking a look at the table of contents, the individual essays have many types of Classical Theists: there are chapters that reflect a wide variety of faith backgrounds; Jewish, Islamic, Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Eastern Orthodox. 

 CT spans a great deal of time, from Parmenides, who lived about 500 years before Christ, to John Duns Scotus (at least), who lived 1200 years after Christ’s triumph over Satan.

In Deuteronomy 6:4, Moses told Israel that God had told him to tell them, “Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one.”

If you believe that God is one, you are some sort of Classical Theist; however, for over a millennia, Christian theologians have been asking, “God is one what?” and different Classical Theists have answered that question in different ways, which leads to quite a bit of confusion.

To try and clear up this confusion, I will try and present two very different views of God that were held by two of the theologians that Stockman referred to in his article, Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430 A.D.), and Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274 A.D.)

Augustine was born in 354 in North Africa. His mother was a Christian, and his father was a pagan. While he received a Christian education, when he was 18, Augustine moved to Carthage and fully indulged in its pagan culture and had a son out of wedlock at the age of 19. While he was 19, Augustine read Cicero and declared that while rhetoric was his profession; his heart was in philosophy. Augustine became a Manichaean and struggled with the Epicurean problem of evil. After teaching rhetoric at Carthage, Augustine moved to Italy at the age of 29 and opened a school of rhetoric. After a few years, Augustine moved to Milan, read the works of Plato and Plotinus, and fully embraced Christianity at the age of 33. Augustine worked to fuse Platonic philosophy with Christian dogmas, and continued to struggle to resolve the problem of evil. Augustine returned to North Africa at the age of 34, where he served many years in the church at Hippo as a Priest and eventually as Bishop. (A much fuller account of the life of Augustine may be found at newadvent.org, St. Augustine of Hippo).

After converting to Christianity, Augustine had to reconcile how evil came into the world with his belief in the God of the Bible. We need to think through how Augustine thought of God, and how Augustine rationalized an answer to the problem of evil, which allowed him to believe that God existed, was Omnipotent, and Omnibenevolent.

The problem of evil has 3 basic components:

An Omnipotent God could stop evil from coming into the world.

An Omnibenevolent God would want to stop evil from coming into the world.

We could easily blame a previous evil for a current evil, but the problem of evil asks how evil came into the world. To answer, “How did evil come into the world”, we need to restrict the discussion to how the first evil came into the world, rather than how evil keeps coming into the world today.

Augustine believed that Adam committed the first sin (Romans 5:12), that God, by his Omnipotent power could have stopped Adam from sinning, thus, it must be good that there is evil in the world.

Augustine wrote, “Nor can we doubt that God does well even in the permission of what is evil. For He permits it only in the justice of His judgment. And surely all that is just is good. Although, therefore, evil, in so far as it is evil, is not a good; yet the fact that evil as well as good exist, is a good. For if it were not a good that evil should exist, its existence would not be permitted by the Omnipotent Good” (Enchiridion, C. 96).

Augustine used what I call an “Omni-benevolence category theodicy”.  This category of theodicy tries to explain why it was good for God to ordain, permit, or otherwise allow evil to come into the world, because God, being Omnipotent, could have stopped evil from coming into the world.

How God can will evil to happen, and it is good that evil happens, was a conundrum Augustine solved by stating, “Accordingly, in the case of these contraries which we call good and evil, the rule of the logicians, that two contraries cannot be predicated at the same time of the same thing, does not hold” (Enchiridion, C. 14). 

God can will evil, and it is good that God wills evil, because the rules of logic do not apply to God’s Omni-benevolence. 

Augustine also believed that everything happens as God wills, “Nothing, therefore, happens but by the will of the Omnipotent, He either permitting it to be done, or Himself doing it” (Enchiridion, C. 95).

In Parmenides, Plato writes, “Must it not be of a single something, which the thought recognizes as attaching to all, being a single form or nature.”

For Augustine, God was one essence, and the essence of God is a will. God is to be conceived of as one will, and the forms of God’s will would be a perfect will, an ordaining will, a will of permission, etc. 

For Augustine, some of the attributes of God are incomprehensible. For example, why did God love one twin and hate the other? Because, “The love, therefore, wherewith God loves, is incomprehensible and immutable” (Tractate 110).  

God, prior to creation, willed everything that would take place, and knew everything that would take place.  After creation, God either did everything himself, or permitted the creatures he created to do what he willed prior to creation of the universe. 

Augustine also spent a great deal of time on Romans 9 and how the election of Jacob and Esau, before they were born, fit into the will of God. Prior to any person being created, God willed the eternal destination of each person. God being in the Heavens, and doing as He pleases, means that God could permit Adam to sin and bring evil into the world, and God could choose to save some from eternal destruction, and pass over others and permit them to spend eternity in hell.

Augustine wrote, “The condemnation of those whom in His justice He has predestined to punishment, and to the salvation of those whom in His mercy He has predestined to grace” (Enchiridion, Ch. 100).

Any parent will tell you that it is difficult to think of one of your children suffering eternal conscious torment in the fires of hell. Augustine had to reconcile a God who is love, whose will is always done, who could give the gift of faith to every person which would guarantee their salvation, with people going to hell. 

Augustine wrote, “Accordingly, when we hear and read in Scripture that He ‘will have all men to be saved,’ although we know well that all men are not saved, we are not on that account to restrict the Omnipotence of God, but are rather to understand the Scripture, ‘Who will have all men to be saved,’ as meaning that no man is saved unless God wills his salvation: not that there is no man whose salvation He does not will, but that no man is saved apart from His will; and that, therefore, we should pray Him to will our salvation, because if He will it, it must necessarily be accomplished” (Enchiridion, Ch. 103).

Again, Augustine is convinced that an Omnipotent God could save all, so God must have willed many not to be saved. How could a good and just God, will most people to spend eternity in hell, when God could save every single one?

Augustine answers this question in On The Trinity, Book 5, Chapter 1, by positing that God is without passion. If God suffered when a person made in His image went to hell, then God would want to save everyone:

The “creator though He lack nothing, ruling but from no position, sustaining all things without having them, in His wholeness, yet without place, eternal without time, making things that are changeable, without change of Himself, and without passion”.

If God could be made to suffer passion by the creatures He made, God would not send anyone to hell. For Augustine, God being impassible means that God dispassionately predestined most people to hell when he created the world.  God wills all people to sin, and God wills to forgive some people. This is all done prior to creation, according to the will of God, which makes the will of God immutable. God is able to forgive the sins of the elect because God willed to forgive the sins of elect prior to God creating the world, which means God can forgive without His will changing. 

The Protestant Reformation of the 16th century was a revival of Augustinian theology. Martin Luther was an Augustinian monk.  John Calvin stated that he agreed with Augustine. 

John Calvin wrote, “In a word, Augustine is so wholly with me, that if I wished to write a confession of my faith, I could do so, with all fullness and satisfaction to myself, out of his writings” (EPG, p. 20).

Calvin, “It would be utterly absurd to hold, that anything could be done contrary to the will of God . . . Whereas, Augustine proves, by this very argument, that everything that is done on Earth, is effectually ruled, and overruled, by this secret providence of God. Nor does he hesitate to conclude, that everything that is done, is done by the will of God” (EPG, p. 190).

Calvin, “But it could not be otherwise. Adam could not but fall; according to the foreknowledge and will of God” (EPG, p. 76).

Calvin, “The eternal predestination of God, by which He decreed, before the fall of Adam, what should take place, in the whole human race, and in every individual thereof, was unalterably fixed and determined” (EPG, p. 108).

Calvin, “Augustine then adds this short sentence; ‘These are the mighty works of the Lord! Shining with perfection in every instance of His will . . . (God) accomplished what He willed, righteously, and with the height of all wisdom: overruling the evils done, to the damnation of those whom He had justly predestinated to punishment, and to the salvation of those whom He had mercifully predestined to grace” (EPG, p. 26).

Calvin, “Augustine testifies, that men are not chosen because they believe; but, on the contrary, are chosen that they might believe”, “Again, in another place, he says, ‘Who created the reprobate but God? And why? Because He willed it? – Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?’” (EPG, p. 23).

Hopefully you can see from those quotes that Calvin is saying the same thing about Augustine’s version of Divine Simplicity as what I have been describing. This version of Divine Simplicity means that everything takes place necessarily, as God willed it from eternity past, and God is immutable (steadfast) so what he decreed and ordained to happen from eternity past will not change: Calvin, “All we say is that God is in charge of the world which He established and not only holds in his power the events of the natural world, but also governs the hearts of men, bends their wills this way and that in accordance with His choice, and is the director of their actions, so that they in the end do nothing which He has not decreed, whatever they may try to do. Accordingly we say that those things which appear to be in the greatest degree due to chance happen of necessity – not by their own innate properties but because the purpose of God, which is eternal and steadfast, is sovereign in governing them” (BLW, p. 38). Calvin continues, “Accordingly everything that happens, happens of necessity, as He has ordained” (BLW, p. 39).

Martin Luther, a monk in an Augustinian order of the Roman Catholic Church, said much the same thing, “You openly declare that the immutable will of God is to be known, but you forbid the knowledge of His immutable prescience. Do you believe that He foreknows against His will, or that He wills in ignorance? If then, He foreknows, willing, His will is eternal and immovable, because His nature is so: and, if He wills, foreknowing, His knowledge is eternal and immovable, because His nature is so. From which it follows unalterably, that all things which we do, although they may appear to us to be done mutably and contingently, and even may be done contingently by us, are yet, in reality, done necessarily and immutably, with respect to the will of God. For the will of God is effective and cannot be hindered; because the very power of God is natural to Him, and his wisdom is such that He cannot be deceived. And as His will cannot be hindered, the work itself cannot be hindered from being done in the place, at the time, in the measure, and by whom He forsees and wills” (BW, Sect. 9). 

Luther is rejecting simple foreknowledge, that God knows what will take place in the future: Luther is saying that God wills what will take place in the future, so God knows what will take place in the future.

Luther goes on to clarify what he meant by things “even may be done contingently by us, are yet, in reality, done necessarily”.  While God is a necessary being, we are contingent beings, thus, when Luther says something is done contingently, he means that it is done by a contingent creature, not that the choice was contingent upon the creature’s decision, “But, (that we may not be deceived in terms) being done by contingency, does not, in the Latin language, signify that the work itself which done is contingent, but that it is done according to a contingent and mutable will – such a will as is not to be found in God!  Moreover, a work cannot be called contingent, unless it be done by us unawares, by contingency, and, as it were, by chance; that is, by our will or hand catching at it, as presented by chance, we thinking nothing of it, nor willing anything about it before” (BW, Sect. 9).

Thomas Aquinas lived in the 13th century, about 900 years after Augustine. The Roman Catholic Church was completely Augustinian by this time. Augustine was a “Doctor of the Church”, and to go against Augustine would be to go against the teaching Magisterium, which would be tantamount to saying that the Roman Catholic Church was not the Church Jesus founded on Peter, the rock. 

In his book on Thomas Aquinas, G.K. Chesterton remarks, “St. Thomas, for all his love of Greek philosophy, saved us from being Platonists” (Ox, p. 12).  Chesterton continues, “So the Thomist was free to be an Aristotelian instead of being bound to be an Augustinian” (Ox, p. 18).

Chesterton was simply pointing out the historical fact that Luther, Calvin, etc., were Augustinian Platonists, while people like himself (and C. S. Lewis) were Thomistic Aristotelians. Aquinas would recycle the same words Augustine used, while giving them very different meanings, which means we need to pay careful attention to the details to grasp the differences between the two.

For Aquinas, God is one essence, and is to be conceived of as His attributes. 

Rather than the essence of God being a will, Aquinas taught that God’s essence is His existence.

Aquinas gave an example similar to this:

A Pterodactyl has essence and used to have existence.

An Ostrich has essence and has existence.

A Pegasus has essence but has never had existence.

Pterodactyls had existence, but no longer do.

An Ostrich currently has both essence and existence.

The Pegasus is a mythological creature that has an essence, but has never had existence.

Essence and existence are separable in created beings. 

God, having Aseity, was not created, thus, essence and existence are not separable in God, God’s essence is His existence.

Aquinas, “God is the same as His essence or nature” (Prima Pars, Q3, A3).

“Therefore, it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence” (Prima Pars, Q3, A4).

Aquinas agreed with Augustine that “God is truly and absolutely simple” (Prima Pars, Q3, A7).

However, Aquinas disagreed with Augustine that everything happens as God wills it: “The foregoing is to set aside the error of certain persons who said that all things proceed from God according to His simple will, which means that we are not to give an explanation of anything except that God wills it” (SCG, 1.87.5).

We need to return to the problem of evil.

Aquinas wrote, “Whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of Divine Omnipotence” (Prima Pars, Q25, A3).

Aquinas used what I call an “Omnipotence category theodicy”. This type of theodicy shows that it is logically impossible for God to stop evil from coming into the world after God creates creatures with real freedom.

For example, when God created Adam:

Adam was created in the image of God

Adam was created with rectitude of nature

Adam was adorned with the light of reason

Adam’s will was ordered to the good.

Benevolence is “to will the good of another”, and God, being Omni-benevolent, willed the good of Adam.

God did not both will the good of Adam and for evil to befall Adam. That would be logically contradictory.

God gave Adam real freedom. This good gift was given through the freedom to eat from every tree, with a prohibition of eating from one tree. Even Omnipotence could not give freedom and withhold it at the same time, thus, contrary to Augustine, God could not stop Adam from eating from the prohibited tree after Genesis 2:17.

God did not want Adam to do the opposite of what God commanded Adam to do.

God did not give Adam permission to sin.

God did not allow Adam to sin; to allow something implies the power to stop it from taking place.

God did not will Adam to sin. If God willed Adam to sin, then it is a sin to do the will of God.

Aquinas rejected the Nominalism of Augustine (that two contraries can be predicated of God’s goodness at the same time, thus the rules of logic do not apply to God), and taught that God cannot do what is logically contradictory: give real freedom to Adam and withhold it at the same time, or, lie to Adam and remain the Truth, because a being that is both the truth and a liar is logically contradictory and nonsense.

Ed Feser, in his “Beginners Guides to Aquinas” states, “Aristotle and Aquinas would also be baffled by the modern tendency to think of causation as essentially a relation between temporally ordered events” (p. 20). Feser continues, “For Aristotle and Aquinas, it is things that are causes, not events; and the immediate efficient cause of an effect is simultaneous with it, not temporally prior to it” (p. 21).

Now, if that paragraph does not make much sense to you, perhaps you can concede that the task of explaining Thomistic Divine Simplicity is a bit tricky.

A comparison between the “Kalam cosmological argument” vs Aquinas “argument from motion for the existence of God” may bring some clarity.

The Kalam states that everything that begins to exist has a cause, the universe began to exist; Therefore, the universe has a cause. God did not begin to exist, God has always existed; Therefore, God is the cause and creator of the Universe.

The Kalam invites the reader to think back in time to the beginning of the universe. It is an argument that uses temporally ordered events. While I am not opposed to the Kalam as an argument for the existence of God, there are a few things to consider:

Could it be argued that God wound up the world and walked away?

Could it be argued that the prior event caused the current event, which stretches back to the creation of the world, which implies that everything was determined by how God created the world? After all, Atheists (like Sam Harris) concede that temporally ordered events means that everything is determined by the universe, and humans do not have free-will.

Can it be proven scientifically or philosophically that the world began to exist?  Aquinas didn’t think so, instead, he thought that the fact that the Universe began to exist could only be known by Divine revelation.

To explain how Aquinas explained causation, I need to define and explain several terms:

Power is “potent”, as in, God is Omni-potent; thus, God is all powerful.

A potential is “potency”.  A dog has the potential to wake up and run across the room.

While the dog is asleep, it is both potent (having the power to run), and potency (having the potential to run).

Act is “actuality”. The dog in the act of running has actualized the power to run and “moved” from the potency of running to the act of running.

In agreement with Aristotle, Aquinas stated, “potency does not raise itself to act; it must be raised to act by something that is in act” (SCG, 1.16.3).

Aquinas, “God is eternal: Everything that begins to be or ceases to be does so through motion or change. Since, however, we have shown that God is absolutely immutable, He is eternal, lacking all beginning or end (SCG, 1.15.2).

Aquinas is saying that God is immutable because God does not move from potency to act, because anything raised from potency to act must be raised by another that is in act; thus, “There is no passive potency in God” (Aquinas, SCG, 1.16).

Next we need to discuss the four causes: efficient, material, formal, and final cause.

Several years ago, I wanted to get a dog for my kids to enjoy.  Before we bought the dog, I wanted to have a fenced in backyard, so I could let the dog out the back door in our suburb and not have to worry about it.

My work, every evening and weekend for months on end was the efficient cause of the fence.

The type of fence I built, made of wood, plastic, and metal, was the material cause.

The fact that it was a fence was the formal cause. You may be imagining a chain link fence, a wood picket fence, a fence made of vinyl panels, etc.; However, when you are driving through a suburb and see a fence, you know it is a fence, because it takes the form of a fence.

The final cause of the fence is fencing. The fence keeps the dog in and the neighbors out. 

In summary:

Efficient cause: person

Material cause: wood, etc.

Formal cause: fence.

Final cause: the good of fencing.

Now, it probably is not too difficult for you to think of examples in your own life where you are the efficient cause, there is a material cause, where you form the material to effect a final cause.

The same four causes also apply to God.

God is the efficient cause of the Universe.

Matter is the material cause of the Universe.

Planets, people, animals, etc. are the formal cause.

The final cause is that what God created He ordered to the good (i.e., Adam and Eve).

After power, potency, act, and the four causes, I need to explain what is necessary and what is an accident.

Think of a loaf of bread that just came out of the oven.

What is necessary for the substance you just took out of the oven to be called a loaf of bread?

Does it have to be moist? No, you could have baked it until it was dry.

Does it have to be dry? No, it could be moist.

It is not necessary for dryness or moistness to be present for the substance to be a loaf of bread, so things that are not necessary are called “accidents”.

God is a necessary being, so there are no accidents in God.

The creatures that God creates are not necessary beings, so we are contingent.

God being necessary is a different “order” than contingent beings.

When God is the efficient cause of all things, God is the – first order efficient cause – of all things.

God, by the fact that he is upholding the Universe at this very moment, is the first order efficient cause of the entire Universe, and the fact that God is upholding the Universe is what makes it possible for a second order (contingent) person to be the efficient cause of building a fence.

The Thomist asks, “What attributes must God necessarily have prior to God creating anything?”

This is done by a process of remotion, where we remove what God is not, to know what God is (See SCG, 1.14).

God is not nonexistent, God is existence, which is the attribute of Aseity.

God is not finite, God is infinite.

God is not unjust, God is justice.

God is not willing the evil of another, God must be Omni-benevolent.

R.C. Sproul explains the Augustinian perspective of everything happens as God wills: 

When evil comes into the world by God’s sovereign will, it is good that evil occurs (NC, 2007).

Vs.

Aquinas, “God cannot will evil” (SCG, 1.95).

God is not impotent, God must be Omnipotent.

God is not composed of potency and act, God must be pure actuality.

God is not composed, God must be simple (not divisible).

God is not changing (moving from potency to act), God must be immutable (always in actuality).

God is not created or His creation, God must be transcendent to His creation.

God does not fail to uphold the Universe, God is immanent to His creation.

God is not a liar, God is truth.

God is not unreliable, God is faithful.

God is not hate, God is love.

Etc.

Necessary attributes are pure actuality, they do not move from potency to act. 

For example:

God is love.

Love is the essence, being, and substance of God.

Because God is love, God is jealous for those he loves.

Jealousy is not a necessary attribute, rather, it is the attribute of love in action.

Aquinas states, “An accident depends on a substance” (SCG, 1.23.7)

Jealousy is an accident, dependent upon the substance of love.

While God is jealous, and jealousy is an accident, jealousy is not a necessary attribute, or part of the essence, being, or substance of God.

God is just.

Because God is just, God hates evil.

While God hates evil, evil is an accident, evil is not a necessary attribute, or part of the essence, being, or substance of God.

When Thomists say that there are no accidents in God, that does not mean that the accidents of jealousy, grace, mercy, wrath, sovereignty, etc. are not attributed to God: those things are characteristics of God, that are attributed to God, that flow from the essence of God, and God is simultaneously all of His necessary attributes, but God is not simultaneously all of His characteristics.

As creatures, we are composed of both potency and act.

A tree has the potential to be cut down and made into a table.

The table has the potential to be cut up and used as firewood.

We all know a person who squandered their potential.

In Deuteronomy 30, God tells Israel through Moses, “I set before you today life and prosperity, death and destruction” (v. 15). Moses then explains that the choice is theirs to make. God has given contingent creatures the real freedom to choose to obey or disobey, and the choice is contingent on their decision.

The people Moses was speaking to had a will, an intellect, and a conscience.  Paul explains “their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them” (Rom 2:15). 

Choice is a function of the intellect, which is informed by the conscience.  

People make choices, and then they either have the will to carry out that choice or not.  

God cannot be good and withhold the grace people need to be able to choose him.

God cannot force people to freely choose him.

God has told us, “If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and purify us from all unrighteousness” (1 John 1:9).

When God gives the freedom of choice to people, like when God gave Adam and Eve the freedom to choose, and God gave Israel the freedom to choose, God still knows what will be chosen.

As Calvin explains, foreknowledge is not the cause of things (Institutes, 3.23.6).

Aquinas, “The Divine will does not remove contingency from things, nor does it impose absolute necessity on them” (SCG, 1.85).

God knew that the people of Keilah will hand David over to Saul (1 Samuel 23).

God knowing that the people of Keilah will hand David over to Saul did not cause it to happen.

God knowing that the people of Keilah will hand David over to Saul did not make it necessary that it happen.

God knew what will happen if David stayed in Keilah. God knew what will happen when he told David that the citizens of Keilah will hand David over to Saul if David chose to stay in Keilah.

God knew what will happen in both possible contingent futures.

When a choice is made by a contingent creature, and it is contingent upon their choice, people are able to do otherwise than what God wills. People are able to do otherwise than what God predestined. When God gives the freedom to choose to people, like he did to all the people of Israel, God cannot make every person choose life and prosperity.  Foreknowledge does not cause an event to happen, and foreknowledge does not make an event necessary; God can intervene, like He did with David, and David made a different choice with his intellect, with the additional information God gave him.

For God to know how to correctly advise David, and for God to know how best to intervene, God needs to know all possible contingent futures. This is why in Thomistic Classical Theism, God is said to exist in eternity, outside of created time, because God is transcendent over His creation, and God simultaneously knows all possible contingent futures, which means that God knows how best to interact with each and every one of us.

The death of the timeless God has only taken place in the small minds of the philosophically inept.

This explanation started out by stating it would be: A layperson’s response to Chris Stockman’s assertion that the God of Classical Theism cannot forgive sinners because forgiveness requires an immutable, atemporal, God to change.  Stockman also pointed out that for God to forgive, God would have to suffer passion and be “moved to do something in response to something outside of Himself”.

Aquinas, and Scripture, both say that “God is love”. For Aquinas, God is love in pure actuality. Each of God’s attributes extends to every other attribute, and God’s attributes are all co-extensive simultaneously. 

God’s love is just.

God has the wisdom to love justly.

God has the power to wisely love justly.

The attributes of God that are necessary are all simultaneously one, because God doesn’t stop being just when he loves, and God doesn’t cease to be love when he dispenses justice.

God being impassible means that a contingent creature cannot swap places with God (a necessary being), and become the first order causation that moves God from the potency to love to the act of loving. 

This would be like a stream rising higher than its source. 

God is love, and God is already, and always, in the act of loving his creation. God is immutable because God does not change from potency to act. God can forgive sinners because sinners do not have to be the cause of moving God from the potential to love them to the act of loving them.

Stockman also wrote, “Classical Theism fundamentally denies that God even stands in a real relation to the world at all”, then quotes Aquinas, “But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above in treating of the divine names”. 

The Question Stockman quotes from is Prima Pars, Q28, “Whether there are real relations in God?”

Aquinas answers, “Therefore as the Divine procession are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained, these relations, according to the Divine processions, are necessarily real relations” (Prima Pars, Q28). The relations Aquinas is considering are the concepts of paternity and filiation in God. As is stated in Q28, “The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy”.

For Aquinas, God is one nature and His creation is of a different nature. 

If Stockman wants us to be in real relation to God, in the way Aquinas is discussing, then we need to be in very nature God. 

If each of us is in very nature God, then God is a Quadrinity (or Trillioninity), rather than a Trinity.

For Aquinas, the creature is separate from God, and God is transcendent above His creation. 

Stockman has simply misunderstood the definition of relation, and has stated something about Aquinas that is incorrect. If you have read this far, you can probably grasp how easy it is to misunderstand meanings when reading either Augustine or Aquinas. 

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