Simply Unforgivable

By Chris Stockman

Prior to declaring war on some other apologists of my generation, I contended that one consequence of God being timeless is that he cannot forgive anyone. That is, if one affirms classical theism (divine timelessness, immutability, and impassibility) then they ought to also believe that God cannot forgive them.[1] These, however, are only three of the classical distinctives. The fourth plank of classical theism, which is often taken to be the foundational doctrine to the whole system, is the doctrine of divine simplicity.

One may wonder why I have separated simplicity from the other classical doctrines in these articles. First and foremost, was length considerations. The previous article was long enough even without looking at simplicity. But, second, is the intended audience. I was not writing that article for the trained philosopher or theologian, but rather the average churchgoer who has heard certain claims about God casually thrown out from the pulpit and has uncritically accepted them. The average person has heard God is timeless and unchanging very often. By contrast, I would wager that 90% or more of Christians have not even heard of simplicity, much less know what it actually is. This is interesting, since certain advocates of simplicity treat it as a test of orthodoxy.[2] I find this use of simplicity puzzling, since I cannot think of a single other doctrine that is as abstract and far removed from being relevant to the Christian life. Thus, I was initially going to leave simplicity out of the discussion entirely. But, as the first article was coming together, I realized a well-rounded discussion should include it. 

So what is divine simplicity (DS hereafter)? As with the other classical doctrines, this is not always easy to nail down. Not every classical theist is forthcoming with a succinct definition of their claims, and I do not think that every thinker throughout church history that has claimed belief in DS has believed the same thing.[3] Some use simplicity to say merely that God does not have physical parts. Others, however, make the more controversial claim that God does not have metaphysical parts.[4] And just about everything passes for a metaphysical part in the classical schema. 

DS is well construed as a set of claims:

  • “The doctrine of divine simplicity teaches that (1) God is identical with his existence and his essence and (2) that each of his attributes is ontologically identical in him with every other one of his attributes.”[5]
  • There are no distinct realities in God.[6]
  • God has no attributes.[7] (So, are all of God’s attributes identical with each other, and so he has one attribute, or does he have no attributes?)
  • God has no potential at all, but is purely actual.[8]

A decent summary is: God has no attributes, is his own existence, and cannot possibly be other than he is, since rejecting any of these would require that he have metaphysical parts, which would just be the worst.[9]

If you are sitting there wondering what the heck any of that is supposed to mean, you are in good company. I cannot make heads or tails of the idea that God is existence, and I suspect that is precisely the point. Those who are committed to saying that God has no attributes, is passion-less, is time-less, etc. are avoiding making any positive claims about God, saying instead only what he is not. The affirmation of DS is therefore a mainstay in the apophatic tradition.[10] If apophatic theology is the only appropriate theology, then, as CS Lewis said “we worship we know not what.” Classical theists apply this to the nth-degree. There are advocates of this view that have stated to me “God does not exist”, in the interest of upholding the idea that God is existence. Now, if your view of God forces you to say that he does not exist, I take that as a good sign that you are deeply confused about God. I do not know why so many Christians find it desirable to give worship and entrust their lives to someone that they do not actually know a thing about. In Acts 17, Paul aimed to make known the previously unknown God. He noticed the altar in Athens to an “unknown god” and saw his opportunity to proclaim the Most High. He did not keep God shrouded in unapproachable mystery as the DS advocate forces themselves to. By the apophaticist’s metric, the Apostle Paul was a horrible theologian.

Anyway, as with timelessness, this doctrine has some unfortunate implications. One of them is what’s called “modal collapse”;[11] basically, DS makes this world necessary. There is no other way things could have been. Abuse victims had to suffer their abuse. Your family member had to die without receiving Christ. Another implication could be that God is a property.[12] As I’ll argue here, another implication is that God cannot forgive you.

A quick note: perhaps this is not your father’s divine simplicity. If this is not a DS you recognize, then I submit that it may not be simplicity that you believe,[13] because all of these claims above are express statements by classical theists, old and new. These are exactly the things that they say. If the shoe doesn’t fit, find a new shoe. It is also possible that there are some intramural disagreements between DS supporters; perhaps not everyone agrees with Anselm, for example. If you reject a particular tenet of what I take to be DS, then fair enough.

Another quick note: perhaps you don’t want to read this whole article. You may just be wondering if you should affirm simplicity or deny it. You should reject DS if:

  1. You think it is incoherent.
  2. You think its implications are false.
  3. You think Scripture teaches against it.
  4. You have any intelligence at all.

Ok, maybe the last reason is wide of the mark. Classical theists are often sharp thinkers that, I believe, are just misled by some counterintuitive metaphysics. It’s not an intelligence question as some may cast it, but rather a question of whether or not one finds attractive the prior commitments that the classical tradition requires. For my part, I find them wildly implausible.

The Problems of Forgiveness

“But God is truly called in manifold ways, great, good, wise, blessed, true, and whatsoever other thing seems to be said of Him not unworthily: but His greatness is the same as His wisdom; for He is not great by bulk, but by power; and His goodness is the same as His wisdom and greatness, and His truth the same as all those things; and in Him it is not one thing to be blessed, and another to be great, or wise, or true, or good, or in a word to be Himself.”~Augustine[14]

“You are happy, indeed you are by nature happiness, because you are in possession of yourself.”~John Duns Scotus[15]

Keep these in mind; they’ll help us later.

So, I contended previously that a timeless God cannot forgive because he cannot change. One rejoinder could be that the classical theist could just say that God’s one act of being includes his act of wrath on sinners and his act of forgiveness to anyone who turns from their sin. After all, since they affirm that everything in God is God, they would just say his wrath is identical to his forgiveness which is identical to his existence. Therefore, since he is simple, the classical God can forgive you. Problem solved, right?

Not so fast. Actually, things just got worse. Much worse.

Problem #1: No real relations.

Normally, when discussing the doctrine of no real relations, one would quote from Thomas Aquinas, perhaps Summa Contra Gentiles II.11-13 or Summa Theologiae 1 q.45 a.3. You know, where he explicitly states that God isn’t really related to the world? Sadly though, I have been informed that I don’t understand him. So I’ll settle for Peter Lombard (1100-1160) saying basically the same thing. Maybe I understand him?

From these comments, it is plainly shown that some things are said of God in time relative to creatures, without change of the deity but not without change of the creature; and so the accident is in the creature, not in the Creator. And the name by which the creature is called relative to the Creator is relative, and it denotes the relation which is in the creature itself; the name by which the Creator is called relative to the creature is also relative, but it denotes no relation which is in the Creator.”[16] (Sentences I Dist. XXX.1)

Let’s apply Pete’s logic to God’s forgiveness.

I say that X is in a forgiving relationship with Y if and only if the propositions “X is the forgiver of Y” (or vice versa) and “Y is forgiven by X” (or vice versa) are both true. In my previous article I laid out at least a partial definition of forgiveness, but here that definition doesn’t actually matter. Christians affirm that God is our forgiver; our faith is false without it. But the proposition “God is the forgiver of a repentant sinner” has just been, by implication, literally denied by the classical theist. The relationship (forgiving a sinner) does not really have a referent on God’s end. Lombard says the accident, or property, (being forgiven in our case) is in us. But then he says that “the name by which the Creator is called relative to the creature…denotes no relation which is in the Creator”. Forgiver is not actually referring to anything in God. Then what does “God is the forgiver of a repentant sinner” refer to?

Aquinas comes to the rescue! Maybe I understand him if I’m using him to bail out the classical theist? Is that how this works? Aquinas wasn’t silly; he knew there had to be some way we can be related to God. So he called such relations to God “relations of reason”.[17] These relations exist solely in our understanding. Creator, Redeemer, Lord, Savior, Sustainer…it’s all in your head. Whether or not this answer is compatible with Christianity is left as an exercise to the reader.

Problem #2: No real distinctions.

Remember Augustine and Scotus above; where God is happiness itself, and there is nothing distinct in God, that everything said of God is really the same thing? This backfires on the classical theist, as it happens. Recall the (working) definition of forgiveness from the prior article:

“You are feeling indignation or at least have some negative evaluation of the other person. But in response to someone asking for your forgiveness, or due to some consideration of what the ethical thing to do is, you forgive them. Your forgiveness involves you changing your evaluation of the person, and you no longer hold their offensive action towards you against them.”

We wrong someone, and so they feel indignation towards us. Then we apologize, or make reparations, and then they relinquish their indignation towards us. Their pre-forgiveness state is qualitatively different from their post-forgiveness state. They felt wrath and now are at peace with us; regardless of what one thinks about time and befores/afters,[18] they are distinct states to be in. Can God do this?

            I do not see how, on DS. Since all that we say is in God, say, wrath, would be identical to everything else we say is in God, say, grace or happiness, there is no such thing as distinct states for God to be in. Not even conceptually! There is only God as happiness itself. There can only be God’s happy, graceful, loving, wrath (which is God himself, in case you forgot). Thus, there will be no difference between a simple God’s state “prior” to his forgiveness of me and his state “when” he has forgiven me, even using temporal notions non-literally. And thus, the defender of DS seems forced to reject at least one of the following claims, which I will call the Five Ways (Out):

  1. God is wrathful towards unrepentant sinners.
  2. God is not wrathful towards repentant sinners.
  3. God is not at peace with unrepentant sinners.
  4. God is at peace with repentant sinners.
  5. We can say that God forgives repentant sinners.

Claims 1-4 would be the move by someone who thinks one need not have any negative evaluation of someone at any point in the forgiving process, or else that one may still feel negatively towards someone after forgiving them (discounting human deficiencies; this is God we’re talking about). Rejecting (1) is unlikely to be a popular move, as it is the express statement of a prophet of the Lord (John 3:36). Rejecting (2), and so affirming that God is wrathful towards repentant sinners, may sit well with the Calvinist but not with normal Christians, as we are not under God’s condemnation (John 3:18). Rejecting (3) is unwise as well, since it is by faith that we gain peace with God (Romans 5:1). If I had peace with God before I repented, then I lose my grasp on just what repentance is supposed to do. Rejecting (4), by my lights, provides strong motivation to stay in my sin, or otherwise to not want the “peace” that 2 John 3 says will be with us from God.

            That leaves (5) as the only way out. The classical theist can say that God does something,[19] but whatever it is, it cannot include forgiveness. I will leave it to the classical theist to make the case that we still have a gospel if we cannot say that God forgives repentant sinners.

            Ok, there is, technically, a sixth Way. In theory, the classical theist could just say that forgiveness need not involve distinct states for the forgiver to be in, and thus they would reject how I define forgiveness. This will come at a cost, though, namely the cost of intuition. I find it a highly non-intuitive account of forgiveness that says that I can be forgiven by a God who feels the exact same way about me having forgiven me as he does without having forgiven me.

The End of The Matter

            I think I have shown that all four distinctives of classical theism run directly counter to the crucial claim of Christianity that God forgives sinners. Thus, I can only call divine simplicity an “own goal” in theology, just like timelessness. The view is difficult, if not impossible, to even be made coherent. By my lights, the classical distinctives make gibberish out of Christian theology and are among the biggest mistakes in all of church history.

So, why in the world would any person hold on to their divine simplicity? I think Dr. William Hasker expressed my thoughts well when he wrote:

Many of us, I believe, encountered our first philosophically serious theism in the writings of eternalist theologians such as Augustine and Aquinas–not to mention C.S. Lewis! As a result, the eternalist conception of God became incorporated into our thinking and belief at a rather deep level.

            But many of us have also found our philosophical home in the analytical tradition. And it is simply a fact that the habits of thought engendered by that tradition are not particularly congenial to the theory of divine timelessness.”[20]

            The sentiment holds, I think, for classical theism in general. And I don’t mean to say that tradition is THE reason why anyone holds to it; classical theists do have their arguments. But there is something comfortable about tradition, to be sure. It is a nice feeling to know that one has centuries of great theologians agreeing with them. I certainly don’t want to give anyone the impression that I have no respect for the classical tradition and just want to be “freed” from its “shackles” like an angsty new atheist. Far from it; I respect the tradition enough to study it and take it seriously. I love tradition, and I greatly enjoy reading such luminaries as Athanasius the Great, Boethius, and John of Damascus, despite their mistakes. I smile at the thought of meeting them in the Resurrection (and winning arguments with them). But, I cannot shake the hold that the “analytical tradition” has on me.

            Regardless of your tradition, pursue truth.[21]


[1] This is not a response to Jordan Ferrier’s article.

[2] Some make claims like that simplicity is the only way in which one can be a monotheist, or the only way that one can say that God is necessary. Such claims I consider to be not worth taking seriously.

[3]William Hasker, in Jeffrey Jordan (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: The Key Thinkers, 14: “About simplicity I have little to say, since those who defend the doctrine can’t seem to agree on exactly what it means. To be sure, God is not assembled out of parts; that much is agreed upon by all. The doctrine of divine simplicity, however, is supposed to mean a great deal more than this, but what that ‘more’ is remains in contention, so it is best to refrain from criticizing until there is a clear target for the criticism.”

[4] Fleshing out the difference here is beyond the scope of this article. In short, simplicity trades on a view of metaphysics in which a thing’s parts include the properties or attributes it possesses. The properties are a proper part of the actual object. For example, the property of redness is a part of a red ball on this view.

[5] Dolezal, James E. God without parts: Simplicity and the metaphysics of divine absoluteness. Westminster Theological Seminary, 2011, 2.

[6] John Duns Scotus, A Treatise on God as First Principle 4.84. How this is compatible with the Trinity is not clear.

[7] Anselm, On the Incarnation of The Word, VII. Anselm rejects even conceptual distinctions applied to God. Thus, one cannot conceive of God plus an attribute; there is only the divine substance. “Therefore, the being of God and the being of his power are the same.”

[8] Edward Feser, Five Proofs of the Existence of God, 30-31 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2017). (And many other places.) Potentiality/actuality is merely the difference between the way the thing is and could otherwise be. For example, I am not a father, but I have the potential to be a father.

[9] This is where a key assumption comes into play. Many ancient thinkers held that something that has parts has been assembled out of those parts; that is, that the thing would then depend on the parts for its existence. The extent to which you think this assumption is plausible is the extent to which you will feel the force of some arguments for simplicity.

[10] Apophaticism, or via negativa (way of negation) is the belief that we can only speak of what God is not, rather than what he is. This is a very mystical tradition that prides itself on not actually knowing anything about God himself.

[11] https://www.reasonablefaith.org/videos/other-videos/the-modal-collapse-objection-to-divine-simplicity

[12] Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980). At least, if one accepts simplicity as Dolezal defines it.

[13] For example, Richard Swinburne, in The Christian God (1994) 160-163, wants to endorse DS. However, I have a difficult time calling his view DS, as he rejects how medieval thinkers expounded it, believes that God is temporal, and is an open theist. Not very classical of him.

[14] Augustine, De Trinitate VI.8

[15] John Duns Scotus, A Treatise on God as First Principle 4.84

[16] Lombard, Sentences I Dist. XXX.1, as in Mullins, The End of The Timeless God, 118-119.

[17] An illustration: I am currently thinking about Will and Brian. Thus, I am really related to them by the relation “thinking about”. But (so the thinking goes) Will and Brian are not really related to me, not even by the relation “being thought about”. Their relation to me is thus a relation of reason; it is only in my apprehension of them.

[18] Here I have in mind the concept of a logical moment in contrast to a temporal moment.

[19] But since God has only one act which is identical to himself, which is unknowable to us, this means that we can’t know what it is.

[20] William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, 180-181.

[21] Thanks to Travis Pelletier, Mariah Woolley, and Dr. RT Mullins for looking over prior editions of this and for the helpful feedback.

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