Why Would God Forgive You?

You may be thinking “What a dumb question. Because he’s a good God and because I repented.” And that is a very reasonable thought. However, there are many Christians that are unable to avail themselves of it due to a theological commitment they have. This is second in a little series on discussing the doctrines of classical theism. I believe these doctrines are all important to discuss, as each one of them taken individually would entail the falsehood of Christianity. That’s right; the doctrines that many people have regarded as gospel truth entail that the Gospel is false. I wrote previously that if God is timeless, or “outside of time”, that he is unable to forgive you. That by itself is pretty bad. But it gets worse. There is another core claim that classical theists hold dear: impassibility

First, here’s how I had defined forgiveness previously: Someone wrongs you, and then, assuming they feel remorse (or if they don’t, but for present purposes assume they do), they apologize and ask for your forgiveness. You are feeling indignation or at least have some negative evaluation of the other person. But in response to someone asking for your forgiveness, or due to some consideration of what the ethical thing to do is, you forgive them. Your forgiveness involves you changing your evaluation of the person. There is something that occurs outside of you that moves you to do something. 

As with time, saying God is impassible isn’t saying anything unless we know what a passion is. This one is more controversial to define (with some characterizing it as God not experiencing any emotions), but it is more accurately held to be the claim that God cannot be acted upon1 and that there cannot be a disturbance in the For-I mean God’s eternal bliss,2 and that God cannot be affected by any considerations outside of himself. St. John of Damascus (A.D. 675-749) called a passion “...a sensible activity of the appetitive faculty, depending on the presentation to the mind of something good or bad…But passion considered as a class, that is, passion in general, is defined as a movement in one thing caused by another.”3 Elsewhere in his work, Damascene states over and over and over that God is impassible, that deity is passion-less, or some variation of that. Thus for Damascene, the impassible God cannot admit a passion (movement) in his emotional or mental life by something outside of himself. Now, I disagree with Damascene, but he is illustrative of The Tradition™️, at least as it appears in its medieval iteration. So how does this make things worse? 

Remember how I said forgiveness involves changing your evaluation of someone in response to their apology? That is impossible per the doctrine of impassibility, as that would mean God has been moved to do something in response to something outside of himself. Your confession and repentance to God quite literally can have no effect. (How prayer in general even works on classical theism is another issue as well.) The idea that God can be moved to do anything is utterly anathema to the classical theist. One of the underlying reasons why this is so is that classical theism fundamentally denies that God even stands in a real relation to the world at all. Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1225-1274) was not unclear: “But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above (I:13:7) in treating of the divine names.”4 This answer was given in response to the objection that if creation is applied to God in the active sense, then he would be temporal. There is more that could be said on that point, but that is far beyond the present scope. 

Here, let’s assume that there is some sort of change that is still compatible with the classical theist view of God. The argument here is that even if God can (Cambridge?) change in his posture towards us, which I believe I showed to not be allowed given the assumptions of divine timelessness, that he cannot do so on the basis of our repentance. 

Here is the argument from impassibility against forgiveness being because of repentance: 

  • 1. If God is impassible, he is not capable of being moved to do an action by anything external to himself. 
  • 2. If God forgives someone because they have repented, then he has been moved to act by something outside of himself. 
  • 3. God is impassible. 
  • 4. Therefore, God cannot be moved to act because of something outside of himself.
  • 5. Therefore, God cannot forgive someone because they have repented. 

As with every argument, there are ways out of it. I wouldn’t presume to come up with a knockdown argument here that has absolutely no ways out. However, my goal here is not to kill impassibility. My goal is to raise the “intellectual price tag” of the doctrine to a price that no one should pay in this economy. This argument is logically valid, so in order to reject the uncomfortable conclusion, that leaves rejecting one of the premises as the only way out. Rejecting 4 is not an option since it logically follows from premises 1 and 3, so there are only three options for the classical theist to choose from to reject: 

  • 1. They could deny that impassibility has anything to do with being moved to do an action by something external to oneself. 
  • 2. They could deny that forgiveness needs to be given in response to something external to the agent. 
  • 3. They could deny that God is impassible. 

Choosing the first option to reject wouldn’t be a bad idea, and it has been offered by some significant thinkers throughout history. Classical theists oftentimes like to act as if there was a unanimity of thought on the doctrines they hold dear, but as someone who has read many primary sources for myself, this is not correct. There have been different understandings of impassibility. Consider the view of St. Gregory of Nyssa (A.D. 335-394), the influential Cappadocian father: 

Therefore what is joined to the will and turns it from virtue to vice is truly passion; but whatever is seen in nature, which proceeds successively in its proper sequence, this would much more properly be called a “work” than a passion, such as birth, growth, the continuance of the subject through the inflow and outflow of nourishment, the concourse of the elements of the body, the dissolution of the composition again, and [its] departure to kindred [elements].”5 

For Gregory here, passions, and therefore impassibility, had to do with moral status. It’s in accordance with my nature that I’m hungry and want to eat, but that becomes a passion when I gorge myself and fall into the vice of gluttony. Similarly, if it is fitting for God (in his nature) to become angry at sin and happy at a sinner who repents, then that will not be a mark against impassibility on this view of what a passion is. If you follow Gregory of Nyssa on this point and that’s your impassibility, fair enough! Your position on this doctrine should flow out of your view of what a passion is. Unfortunately, many classical theists will not take this route, opting instead for a God that is not affected by any external goings-on. 

Behind door #2 lies some uncomfortable truths. Applied to God, this would entail arbitrary forgiveness, unless one is prepared to appeal to mystery and say that God has a reason for forgiving you6, but that it’s a secret.7 God has been widely held to act on the basis of reasons among Christian thinkers. I take it as uncontroversial that it’s better to be rational than irrational, and so rationality would be one of God’s perfections. Since God is a perfect being, he must have all perfections. He must act on the basis of reasons. Early Christians made extensive use of their understanding of the “logos” (word, reason, or principle) of God: God was never without his Reason, so the Logos of God must be coeternal with him. Further, this Logos is what pervades all of creation, and so the world is rationally understandable. (Setting the stage for the development of science as a consequence!) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz pressed this point so far that he maintained that God’s middle knowledge gave him the knowledge of which world he should create; the reason why God created the particular world that he did was that he created the best one out of all the possibilities.8In fact, Leibniz even argued that if God did not have a reason for acting, that he would be unable to act! Further, if there was no condition for God’s forgiveness, how could we know if we are forgiven? This possibility engenders a radical skepticism regarding our status with God. Scripture says that when I am faithfully following Jesus, I am well-pleasing to him (Romans 14:18). It is a mystery to me how a classical theist can say that they are ever well-pleasing to God. After all, their life can never be the thing that God is pleased with since it is not God…right? Please say your life is not God. 

Now, if one is ok with being innovative with their theology, then attributing arbitrary actions to God9 will be no problem for them. Fair enough, although this would be a surprising move given that many classical theists are in the habit of practicing “retrieval theology”, which means they want to get their theology from their preferred old dead guy; so do they want to innovate or do they want to follow a tradition? But anyway, as I said earlier, here I am just trying to raise the price of holding to impassibility. I find this price way too expensive, and for that reason, I’m out. 

Option 3 is very lovely. Yes, there are versions of impassibility that are not problematic here, such as that of Gregory of Nyssa. However, I am not living in the theological climate of the 4th century, and so, in the current landscape, I think that it’s clearer to just say that I reject impassibility. Most classical theists today don’t have Gregory’s view of the passions having to do with morality, they have something more like John of Damascus’ that we saw above, wherein God cannot be moved in any way. 

Conclusion 

God does have an emotional life, and he does get angry at you for your sin, and it does please him if you repent. Don’t worry–you can give God a reason to forgive you of your sin. You can repent and follow Jesus, who is the way, the truth, and the life (John 14:6). No one comes to the Father except through him, and you can know that you’ve come by way of Jesus if you trust in his work to die for your sins and rise for your eternal life (Romans 10:9-10). 


1 Consider Charles Hartshorne, as discussed in Richard Creel’s informative volume Divine Impassibility: An essay in philosophical theology (1986), 1-12.

2“Rather than having a finite god who can be a fellow-sufferer with us, we should rather have the God who, in his eternal bliss, understands our suffering and overcomes them.” 

(https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/themelios/article/the-impassible-god-who-cried/) How rejecting God as our fellow-sufferer is compatible with Hebrews 2:17-18 is an exercise for the reader, as well as how that would make God finite. 

3 Exposition of the Orthodox Faith 2.22 

4 Summa Theologica 1 q.45 a.3

5 Catechetical Discourse 16.1, St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Popular Patristics Series 60. Gregory is answering objections to the “God-befittingness” of the Incarnation, one of which was that the impassible divine would have become joined to passions.

6 Here I don’t consider the possibility that God’s forgiveness is for secret reasons to be one that many people will go for. 

7If this sounds like it runs parallel to Calvinism’s unconditional election, perhaps now you have an idea of some of its theological underpinnings. Consider the skepticism that we are left with regarding God if we follow Calvin in Institutes 1.17.13. God can’t actually be angry at the Ninevites (from 1.17.12), he just looks that way to us in Scripture since he’s so high above us we can’t understand him. One wonders how Calvin could understand God then. 

8 Leibniz, Theodicy. I disagree with Leibniz here but that’s not the point. 

9 To say nothing of nested arbitrary actions. A nested arbitrary action would be something such as getting out of bed in the morning. I have no reason to get out at 7:00 as opposed to 7:01, but I do have reason to get out of bed. So getting out of bed at 7:00 is a nested arbitrary action. This is a helpful category for answering Leibniz’ complaint in The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence that a temporal God could not create since he would have no reason to create at one moment of time as opposed to another. God has reason to create, but the particular moment does not matter, and so it’s not a totally arbitrary action.

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